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LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF A SPACE-BASED
BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE*
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In his speech of March 23, 1983, President Ronald Reagan
presented what he called "a vision of the future which offers hope."'
He urged America to "embark on a program to counter the awesome
Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive." 2 While ac-
knowledging that the task of deploying an effective ballistic missile
defense (BMD)3 may not be accomplished before the end of the cen-
tury, President Reagan ordered "a comprehensive and intensive ef-
fort to define a long-term research and development program to
begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by
strategic nuclear missiles." 4
This was not the first time an American President called for a
BMD system.5 President Reagan's proposal is of great significance,
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source material.
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I. President's Speech on Military Spending and a New Defense, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24,
1983, at 20, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as President's Speech].
2. Id.
3. "Ballistic Missile Defense" (BMD) is the terminology currently in favor. The older
term "Anti-ballistic missile," (ABM) is also used herein. They are interchangeable.
4. President's Speech, supra note 1. This effort has been referred to by many as Reagan's
"Star Wars" strategy. Within the U.S. Department of Defense, it is officially referred to as the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Weinberger, Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of
Defense (Apr. 24, 1984). United States Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger has estab-
lished an SDI organization. He declared that the organization's ultimate goal is to eliminate
the threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles, while increasing the contribution of such defen-
sive systems to U.S. and Allied security. Id.
5. United States interest in a BMD goes back to 1954. See ABM: AN EVALUATION OF
THE DECISION TO DEPLOY AN ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM xv (A. Chayes & J. Wiesner
ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as Chayes & Weisner]. In the late 1950s a system known as "Nike-
Zeus" was developed, but deployment was blocked by President Eisenhower. Id. at 3. In 1967
the Johnson Administration examined the "Sentinel" system for area defense. In 1969 Presi-
dent Nixon announced a decision to deploy the "Safeguard" BMD system. Id. at 4. That
decision was later reversed. Schmemann, Soviet Sees a Treaty Violation In Arms Proposed by
Reagan, N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1983, at A9, col. 5.
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however, for three important reasons. First, there are assertions that
such a system would violate United States treaty obligations. Sec-
ond, the cost of the program would be immense. Finally, many be-
lieve a BMD, even if technologically feasible, would be strategically
ill-advised.
This article will examine the legal aspects of the proposed space-
based BMD systems.6 Only the American proposals will be ex-
amined since little is known of the Soviet efforts in this area.7 Never-
theless, the legal analysis is applicable to any space-based BMD,
American or Soviet, since both countries are parties to the relevant
treaties. The inquiry commences with a survey of important facts
necessary to an understanding of the legal issues involved. Current
military uses of outer space, space related BMD technology, as well
as strategy and policy are discussed. This information is then applied
to the ABM Treaty' and Outer Space Treaty, 9 the two agreements of
primary importance.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Current Military Uses of Outer Space
The military has always appreciated the advantages of taking
the "high ground." Space is no exception. Earth orbiting satellites
have been used extensively by the military for communications,'
0
6. See infra text accompanying notes 61-67 for a discussion of the scope of the term
"space-based."
7. It is known that the Soviets have been conducting research on technologies which can
be used in a BMD. STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, WORLD
ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT 291 (1982) [hereinafter cited as WORLD ARMAMENTS].
The United States has accused the Soviet Union of violating ABM Treaty commitments by
building a large radar of a type that could be used to control interceptions of incoming ballistic
missiles. Doe, Soviet Arms control Violations Debated, A.F. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1984, at 22. This
accusation was probably based on a Central Intelligence Agency report alleging the Soviet
Union is "producing components for and has in place or under construction the major elements
of a nationwide [BMD] system." Robinson, Soviets Accelerate Missile Defense Efforts, AViA-
TION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 16, 1984, at 14.
8. Treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 (entered into
force Oct. 3, 1972) [hereinafter cited as ABM Treaty].
9. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force Oct. 10, 1967) [hereinafter cited as
Outer Space Treaty].
10. Satellites provide 70% of U.S. military long-haul communications. Space Command
Fact Sheet (May 13, 1983).
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surveillance," navigation, mapping, geodesy and weather forecast-
ing. Space has also been used by the military for space transporta-
tion, ballistic missile tests and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon tests.
The common characteristic of military uses of outer space has
been their nonaggressive nature. Deployed satellites are used primar-
ily as a force multiplier to increase the effectiveness of military forces
on earth, rather than to attack hostile targets. Although during bal-
listic missile tests unarmed missiles pass through space on their tra-
jectory, these tests are not an "aggressive use" of space.' 2 Instead,
they merely refine a potential offensive use.
A detailed examination of ASAT weapons is beyond the scope
of this article. Their aim is to destroy or incapacitate other satellites.
The Soviet Union has an operational ASAT with limited capability.' 3
The United States flight tested an ASAT, but it has not been tested
against a target in outer space.' 4
B. Ballistic Missile Defense Technology
BMD technology has come a long way since the "safeguard"
system proposed by President Nixon in 1969. That system was land-
based and consisted of radars, launchers and two types of in-
terceptors with nuclear warheads.' 5 The planned use of nuclear war-
heads was perceived as a severe limitation on the safeguard system.
It could never be tested in an operational mode without severe reper-
cussions since nuclear tests in the atmosphere and in outer space
were banned by the Test Ban Treaty of 1963.16 Moreover, if ever
used, the nuclear explosions of the ABM warheads in the earth's at-
mosphere could cause casualties on the ground. Such explosions
11. "Surveillance" includes space and terresterial surveillance, reconnaissance and arms
control monitoring.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 104-15.
13. The Soviet Union has been testing ASAT weapons since 1968. WORLD ARMAMENTS,
supra note 7, at 305. According to the U.S. Dept. of Defense, the Soviet's ASAT system is
operational and capable of negating low altitude satellites. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, SOVIET
MILITARY POWER 67 (1983).
14. USAF Flight Tests ASAT Weapon, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 30, 1984, at
19. Congress has restricted ASAT tests against targets until President Reagan reports on ef-
forts to negotiate a treaty covering ASAT weapons. Famiglietti, AF Plans 9 ASA T Tests Fol-
lowing January 21 Trial, A.F. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1984, at 24.
15. The two missiles were the Spartan, with a range of several hundred miles, designed to
intercept in outer space; and the Sprint, with a range of 25 miles, designed to intercept war-
heads which penetrated near the ABM base. Chayes & Wisener, supra note 5, at 7.
16. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under
Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43 (entered into force
Oct. 10, 1963) [hereinafter cited as Test Ban Treaty].
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would also interfere with the radars, computers and communications
required for the system to operate.
Subsequent advances in technology have led many to believe a
BMD is now feasible. Significantly, nuclear warheads are no longer
regarded as necessary for an effective BMD. 7 Currently, there are
five principle technologies under consideration as "kill mechanisms"
for a space-based BMD. These include lasers, particle beams and
more conventional self propelled missiles with miniature homing ve-
hicles.' 8 In addition to a kill mechanism, many other technologies
are required for a space-based BMD. 19
Because the technology required for these systems is relatively
immature and very complex, a difference of opinion exists regarding
their feasibility. The Defensive Technologies Study Team Z0  ap-
17. The United States SDI program has been directed to emphasize non-nuclear technolo-
gies. Weinberger, supra note 4, at 18.
18. These five technologies are:
KILL MECHANISM SOURCE OPERATION
Pulsed Laser X-ray Laser Delivers a high impulse
Excimer Laser shock causing structural
collapse of booster
Continuous Wave (CW) Free Electron Laser Stays on target until a
Laser Excimer Laser hole is burned through
Chemical Laser
Continuous Particle Beam Neutral Particle Beam Destroys internal weapon
components
Mass Accelerator Kinetic Energy Rail Gun Accelerates small homing
hit-to-kill vehicles
Self-Propelled Missile Chemical Rockets Homes in and destroys
with hit-to-kill vehicle
Famiglietti, DeLauer Cool to Anti-Missile Missile Plan, A.F. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1983, at 40.
Lasers are beams of intense light which can make a target so hot that its internal mecha-
nisms fail. Chemical lasers achieve their power from spontaneous combustion of hydrogen and
fluorine and emit light in a less effective region of the spectrum. A "Star Wars" Defense,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 4, 1983, at 18-20. Excimer lasers require a large power source and achieve a
tighter light wave that could penetrate "hardened" missile skins of the future. X-ray lasers use
energy from a small nuclear explosion to send an intense focused pulse of x-rays at an enemy
missile, destroying it on impact. Id. Particle beams are essentially "atom smashers" that accel-
erate and direct protons or ions like tiny bullets into a target causing structural and electrical
damage. Id. For a detailed techncal analysis of these and other systems see BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENSE (A. Carter & D. Schwartz ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as Carter & Schwartz].
19. Land and space-based precision sensors are needed for surveillance, target acquisition
and discrimination, tracking and pointing. Electronic systems capable of a billion operations
per second are necessasry. Power supplies for the immense power demands of laser weapons
are needed. Great advances in battle management involving command, control and communi-
cations are also required for effective application of any BMD. To deploy these space-based
systems a heavy-lift space booster must be developed. Additionally, the survivability of space-
based assets, which could be threatened with nuclear or directed energy weapons, is required.
Survivability involves complicated combinations of armoring, deception, mobility, radiation
hardening and defensive weapons for the space assets themselves.
20. This team, headed by James C. Fletcher, former head of the National Aeronautics and
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pointed by President Reagan concluded that an "effective" multi-
layered BMD could be established. The Team noted, however, that
its ultimate effectiveness would depend not only on technological de-
velopment, but also on responses by the USSR to the United States
initiative, and on arms control limitations." Despite the Team's con-
clusion, strong disagreement continues in the scientific community
regarding the technological feasibility of a BMD.2 2 Nevertheless,
many scientists who have criticized the Reagan proposal approve of
continuing research in this area to prevent a "technological surprise"
by the Soviet Union.23
Most of the envisioned BMD systems would be multi-layered to
correspond with the four phases of a ballistic missile's trajectory.24
These are the boost,2 5  post-boost,26  midcourse 27  and terminal
Space Administration (NASA), was formed to examine technology which might provide a
BMD within 15-20 years. Robinson, Panel Urges Defense Technology Advances, AVIATION
WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct. 17, 1983, at 16.
21. By "effective" the team did not mean leak-proof, but strong enough to support a stra-
tegic initiative of forcing the U.S. and USSR to rely on defense, not offense, as a basis of
national strategy. The technology team report concluded President Reagan's objectives could
be met by a system which would "provide an incentive for the Soviet Union to reduce reliance
on ballistic missiles and agree to arms control limitations on their numbers and capabilities."
Robinson, Study Urges Exploiting of Technologies, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct. 24,
1983, at 50, 51.
22. Professor Sidney Drell, Deputy Director of the linear accelerator center at Stanford
University and a former White House defense consultant, sees "no prospect of deploying on the
ground or in space as an effective defense." Getler, Science Advisor Sees Lasers and Mirrors as
a Missile Defense, Washington Post, Mar. 26, 1983, at 8, col. 1; see also Rathjens & Ruina, 100
% Defense? Hardly, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1983, at E19, col. 3 ("It is virtually certain that the
Soviet Union would be able to offset our efforts by improving its offenses-and would probably
be able to do so at a lesser cost."); Carter & Schwartz, supra note 18.
23. Wilford, Despite 1967 U.S.-Soviet Treaty, Drive for Space Weapons Goes On, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 27, 1983, at 1, col. 4.
24. Defense Against Ballistic Missiles, A.F. MAG., Jan. 1984, at 21.
25. The most effective interception is during the "boost phase" because the rocket's ex-
hausts can be tracked and the multiple warheads have not separated. Robinson, supra note 21,
at 50, 57. Boost-phase intercepts could force the USSR away from large, multiple reentry
vehicles. Id. But boost-phase interception is the most difficult because detection, discrimina-
tion, targeting and interception would need to be accomplished very rapidly. The boost-phase
is generally no more than three minutes long, and could be shortend in response to a BMD
with boost-phase capability. Carter, Directed Energy Missile Defense in Space 7-12 (1984)
(Background paper prepared under contract for the U.S. Congress, Office of Technology As-
sessment). This need for rapid decision-making may require removing the "human element"
and delegating decision-making to the weapon system itself. In testimony before a U.S. Senate
Armed Services subcommittee in 1981, Dr. George Milburn, a Pentagon official, stated that a
space-based antimissile system would probably have to be "autonomous .... We would have
to delegate the decision-making to the weapon system itself and we have no experience in that
type of operations system." Mohr, Space Lasers Might Stop Half of Missile Attack, Expert
Says, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1983, at 29, col. 1.
26. In the post-boost phase individual reentry vehicles are being sequentially deployed by
Vol. 15
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phases.28 The exact manner in which the various components of a
BMD system will fit together is not known. However, several may
involve components stationed in earth orbit.29 Other proposals in-
volve components which would operate in space, but would not orbit.
Such components would be land-based and launched only after a So-
viet ICBM attack was detected.3"
C Strategy and Policy
There are two methods to successfully deter an attack: (1) make
a maneuverable "bus." Carter & Schwartz, supra note 18, at 52. Interception in this phase
may also destroy several warheads at once.
27. By the mid-course phase, the individual reentry vehicles have separated and are on
their way to targets. To be effective in this phase, a defensive system would have to be capable
of discriminating between debris, decoys and reentry vehicles. Id.
28. In the terminal phase, discrimination is slightly easier because the atmoshpere slows
down the light-weight decoys and penetration aids from the heavier warheads. The primary
drawback is the short time available for interception. Id. at 53.
29. A report of the North Atlantic Assembly, a NATO advisory body, discussed a three
layer system. The first layer would contain up to 423 orbiting satellites, each armed with 40-50
non-nuclear, self-propelled missiles. The large number of satellites would be necessary for full-
time coverage because they would be in low-earth, and not geostationary orbit. Low-earth
orbit places the weapons closer to their targets thereby reducing the difficulty of aiming and
allowing intercept during the boost-phase. A ground-based layer would involve more conven-
tional technology such as radar controlled guns, and would be used in point defense of high-
value targets. The middle layer would be the most complex technologically. It would involve
directed-energy weapons, either space-based lasers or charged particle beams. Feazel, Europe-
ans Support U.S. Space-Based Systems, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct. 24, 1983, at 59.
Another system envisions large laser platforms stationed in three polar orbits. At least twenty-
four laser platforms would be necessary to insure that eight or more were in range of the main
Soviet missile fields at all times. Tyler, Study Raps Laser Arms Funding Lag, Washington Post,
Mar. 27, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
President Reagan's Science Advisor, George Keyworth, has proposed a laser system using
space-based mirrors. Can Reagan's "Star Wars" Plan Really Work?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., Apr. 11, 1983, at 24 (interview); Getler, supra note 22, at 8, col. 1. The laser power
station would be on the ground to facilitate maintenance and protection. The space-based
mirrors would reflect and point the laser beams at missiles or warheads.
30. One such proposal involves the use of a missile boosted laser weapon for boost-phase
intercept. For boost-phase interception to be accomplished after detection of a Soviet launch,
the BMD might need to be based near the Soviet Union. Land-basing in allied territory as well
as sea-basing in submarines off the Soviet coast are possibilities. Carter, supra note 25, at 27-
28. The small size and light weight of the nuclear x-ray laser make it a candidate for such a
basing mode. Id. For a discussion of the x-ray laser see infra note 96.
Another option calls for interceptor missiles carrying one or more homing vehicles which
would impact and destroy incoming warheads during the terminal phase. The Homing Over-
lay Experiment (HOE) applies to one such system. LASER WEAPONS IN SPACE, POLICY AND
DOCTRINE 55 (K. Payne ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as Payne]. In June 1984, a test of the
HOE was successful. An interceptor missile intercepted and destroyed an incoming dummy
missile warhead. Army Test Missile is Said to Destroy a Dummy Warhead, N.Y. Times, June
12, 1984, at I.
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it impossible to succeed by establishing an effective defense, or (2) as-
sure punishment for the aggressor that will outweigh any potential
gain. For most of the post World War II period, deterrence has
rested upon the second method; it has been ensured by the offensive
capabilities of the United States and the Soviet Union. United States
deterrence policy is based upon the theory that possession by the
United States of survivable strategic systems, with which to retaliate
effectively against the Soviet Union, deters a Soviet first strike. This
policy has provided a long, although uneasy stability.
Supporters of President Reagan's initiative, however, assert that
a BMD offers a rational alternative to this policy. They argue that a
BMD system would move the world toward the first method of de-
terrence. They also assert that a BMD would make a first strike less
likely3" and would offer protection against an accidental launch or
irrational act.32 Moreover, these proponents contend that the contin-
ued development and presence of a Soviet system by itself would un-
dermine deterrence.
Critics of the Reagan proposal have focused on several areas in
addition to issues of the legality and technological feasibility of a
BMD. These critics contend that a BMD system would lead to a
stepped-up arms race,33 yet still leave the United States vulnerable to
other nuclear threats.34 They also argue that such a system would
undermine deterrence of nuclear war3 5 and endanger the present
nonaggressive military use of outer space that enhances the security
of the United States.3 6 Critics assert further that a BMD system
would be prohibitively expensive.37 Lastly, opponents contend that
31. Even if a BMD was not completely effective, an attacker would not know which of his
warheads would succeed in reaching their targets. Therefore, an effective first strike could not
be relied upon.
32. There is currently no method of stopping a missile once it is launched. The Soviet
Union, however, may be able to intercept missiles which are aimed at Moscow. See infra note
41.
33. A defensive weapons arms race could lead to an increase in offensive weapons. Out of
a need to overwhelm a United States BMD system the Soviet Union might improve the quality
and increase the quantity of its offensive weapons. The United States, faced with expanded
Soviet offensive power, might increase its own offensive power.
34. A BMD would be little help against nuclear bombers and cruise missiles, or against
sub-launched ballistic missiles which reach their targets in a matter of minutes on depressed
trajectories.
35. For example, in time of crisis one side may be tempted to launch a first strike if the
other side possessed a significant BMD capability.
36. Placement of weapons and counter-weapons in space could endanger communications
and surveillance satellites upon which the U.S. defense system heavily relies.
37. Total system cost could be in the $100-$500 billion range. Feazel, supra note 29, at
59. The Defensive Technologies Study Team recommended a $21.1 billion development pro-
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the system might eventually lead to pre-emptive warfare in space to
destroy the BMD satellites.3"
II. SPACE-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE ABM
TREATY
A. General Provisions
The 1972 ABM Treaty was a result of the first series of Startegic
Arms Limitations Talks (Salt I). These lasted from November 1969
until May 1972 and resulted in two agreements: the ABM Treaty
39
and the "Interim Agreement With the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Stra-
tegic Offensive Arms."'
Pursuant to the ABM treaty each country may deploy ABM
systems or their components in only two areas. Each country is al-
lowed to protect its capital and one ICBM launching base.41 The
deployment of an ABM system for the defense of either country's
gram just through 1989. Defensive Technologies Study Sets Funding Profile Options, AVIATION
WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct. 24, 1983, at 50. President Reagan's Fiscal Year 1985 Budget
added $250 million in new funds to the $1.5 billion planned previously for strategic defensive
technology; funding continues to grow in the five year defense program for a cumulative total
of $25 billion. Reagan's Space Challenge, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 30, 1984, at
11.
38. President Reagan acknowledged in his speech that defensive systems, when paired
with offensive ones, "can be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy and no one wants that."
President's Speech, supra note 1. His assertion that "we will never be an aggressor" is unlikely
to be taken at face value in the Kremlin. Id. Threats posed by adversaries are generally judged
by capabilities, not by intentions. Indeed, the very idea behind the 1972 ABM Treaty was that
defense was potentially dangerous and could lead one superpower to believe it could safely
launch a first strike and then shoot down the other side's remaining missiles. A Nuclear Heresy,
NEWSWEEK, Apr. 4, 1983, at 2. Therefore, some contend that the Soviet Union would attempt
to prevent a space-based BMD system from becoming operational. Their ASAT capability is
well known. See supra note 13. Former Soviet Premier, Yuri Andropov stated that "[a]ll
attempts at gaining military superiority over the Soviet Union are futile. The Soviet Union will
never allow them to succeed. It will never be caught defenseless by any threat." N.Y. Times,
Mar. 27, 1983, at 1, col. 6.
39. ABM Treaty, supra note 8.
40. Interim Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures
with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 26, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23
U.S.T. 3462, T.I.A.S. No. 7504 (entered into force Oct. 3, 1972). For the text and negotiation
histories of these agreements see U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS
CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS (5th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as ARMS CON-
TROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS].
41. ABM Treaty, supra note 8, art. III. The 1974 Protocol to the ABM Treaty limits each
state to one site only. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 40, at
162. The Soviet Union maintains its site at Moscow. The U.S. originally chose to maintain its
site at an ICBM base, but that site was deactivated and the U.S. currently has no operational
ABM site.
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entire territory was specifically prohibited.42 Each State also under-
took to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offen-
sive arms.
43
Assurance of treaty compliance was to be provided by each
State's "national technical means of verification . . . ."4 In addi-
tion, each Party undertook not to interfere with, or use deliberate
concealment to impede such verification.45 A United States-Soviet
"Standing Consultative Commission" was created to promote the
ABM Treaty's objectives and implementation.4 6  This Commission
was endowed with powers to consider many areas. These include:
(1) compliance with treaty obligations, (2) interference with national
technical means of verification, (3) relevant changes in the strategic
situation, and (4) proposals for further measures to limit strategic
arms.
Article VI of the ABM Treaty is designed to insure that inter-
ceptor missiles, launchers and radars deployed for other purposes
(such as air defense) will not have an ABM capability. It mandates
that such components may not be tested "in an ABM mode '4  or
otherwise given ABM capabilities."a The ABM Treaty also places
qualitative and quantitative restrictions on the ABM systems that
may be deployed. These restrictions concern the number and charac-
teristics of interceptor missiles, launchers and radars.4 9 Unless spe-
cifically prohibited by the Treaty, "modernization and replacement
42. ABM Treaty, supra note 8, art. I. Deployment of a comprehensive BMD, land or
space-based, would clearly violate this provision.
43. Id. art XI.
44. Id. art XII(l).
45. Id. art. XII(2), (3).
46. Id. art. XIII.
47. Id. art. VI. The ABM Treaty contains no definition of this phrase. The U.S. has
stated:
[W]e would consider a launcher, missile or radar to be "tested in an ABM
mode" if, for example, any of the following events occur: (1) a launcher is used to
launch an ABM interceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is flight tested against a
target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic
missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in conjunction with the test of an ABM
interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range, or is flight tested to an
altitude inconsistent with interception of targets against which air defenses are
deployed, (3) a radar makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the kind
referred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion of its trajectory or makes
measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM
radar at the same test range. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS,
supra note 40, at 146.
48. Short of a test "in an ABM mode," however, there are no treaty guidelines on how to
determine whether such "capabilities" exist. See infra text accompanying notes 81-83.
49. ABM Treaty, supra note 8, arts III, IV.
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of ABM systems or their components may be carried out."5 How-
ever, one area where modernizations is specifically prohibited is a
space-base BMD. Each Party agreed not to develop, test or deploy
space-based ABM systems or components.5 t
Although the ABM treaty is of unlimited duration, each coun-
try retained the right to withdraw after giving six months notice. A
country may withdraw "if it decides that extraordinary events have
jeopardized its supreme interests. ' 52 Neither the ABM Treaty nor
the bilateral statements defined this phrase. During the negotiations,
however, the United States position was made very clear by Ambas-
sador Smith, who noted that the United States considered the ABM
Treaty inextricably linked to subsequent agreements on further limi-
tations of strategic offensive arms. This link was considered neces-
sary in order to reduce threats to the survivability of strategic
retaliatory forces.5 3
B. Applicability of the ABM Treaty to the New Technologies
Nowhere in the ABM Treaty are lasers, particle beams, infrared
sensors or other types of new ABM technologies mentioned. The
question therefore arises whether the ABM Treaty covers these new
technologies. Article II of the ABM Treaty defines an "ABM sys-
tem" as:
a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in
flight trajectory, currently consisting of:
(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles
constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in
an ABM mode;
(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and
deployed for launching interceptor missiles; and
(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed
for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.
54
50. Id. art. VII.
51. Id. art. V. This exception also applies to sea, air and mobile land-based ABM systems
or components.
52. Id. art. Xv.
53. In making this point, Ambassador Smith stated that "[i]f an agreement providing for
more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S.
supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should this occur, it would constitute a basis for with-
drawal from the ABM Treaty." Agreed Statements, Common Understandings, and Unilateral
Statements Regarding the Treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limita-
tion of Anti-Ballistic Missiles, reprinted in ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREE-
MENTS, supra note 40, at 156.
54. Id. art. II.
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The purpose of the new ABM technologies is to counter ballistic
missiles or their elements. While they were not listed in Article II,
they were not then "currently" available. A reasonable interpreta-
tion of Article II is that the Paries intended that the development of
new ABM technologies be included within the definition of "ABM
systems." In interpreting a treaty it is often necessary to look further
than its articles. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties15 provides general rules concerning the interpretation of in-
ternational agreements. According to the Vienna Convention, in de-
termining the object and purpose of a treaty the entire treaty,
including its preamble, should be examined. Moreover, any agree-
ment which the Parties make in connection with the treaty, as well as
subsequent practice, is to be considered.
On the day the ABM Treaty was signed another document
which contained agreed statements regarding the treaty was initiated
by the heads of the delegations. One statement addressed the issue of
new technologies based on other physical principles. It provided:
[I]n the event ABM systems based on other physical princi-
ples and including components capable of substituting for ABM
interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created
in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their compo-
nents would be subject to discussion [by the Standing Consultative
Committee] and agreement [for amendment] of the Treaty.5 6
While this agreement is somewhat ambiguous, the provision for dis-
cussion on "specific limitations" on such systems implies an intention
to include them within the general treaty limitations on ABM sys-
tems and their components. If the Parties had intended for no limita-
tions to apply to such systems they would not have needed to use the
word "specific." When read in conjunction with Article II, the most
reasonable interpretation of this agreement is that new technologies
are included within the ABM Treaty's limitations. If the Parties be-
55. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
39/27 [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. While the U.S. is not a Party to this treaty, it
is generally considered an important tool in the interpretation of international agreements.
Kearney & Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1970).
56. Agreed Statements, Common Understandings, and Unilateral Statements regarding
the Treaty with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic
Missiles, reprinted in ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS, supra note 40, at
143 (emphasis added). Referring to this agreed statement, Mr. John Rhinelander, who was the
legal advisor to the U.S. SALT I delegation, wrote "[a]rticles II and III provide the treaty
framework for the ban on "future ABM systems," which is spelled out further in [the] agreed
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lieve a new technology is not adequately covered by the Treaty provi-
sions they may request discussion on specific limitations.
57
The preamble to the ABM Treaty also supports this interpreta-
tion, as it demonstrates the great importance that the Parties at-
tached to the Treaty. In the preamble the Parties stated: "[E]ffective
measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial
factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive weapons and would
lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear
weapons .... ,,58 This statement demonstrates that the Parties
were looking to the future benefits of the ABM Treaty in preserving
peace. Their purpose was not merely to limit ABM systems until a
new technology came along which would make the ABM Treaty
obsolete.
Moreover, subsequent practice of the United States and the So-
viet Union, in the form of official statements, demonstrates that both
States consider the new technologies to be within the scope of the
ABM Treaty. Shortly after President Reagan's speech of March 23,
1983, the legality of his proposal became an issue. United States Sec-
retary of Defense Casper Weinberger stated that the ABM Treaty
allowed for "the study, the research [and] the development . . ." of
a BMD. However, he also noted that the ABM Treaty might have to
be amended when the point of deployment is actually reached.5 9
Similarly, the Soviet Government's press agency TASS commented
that "deployment" would be "a direct violation" of the Treaty.6 °
All of these factors demonstrate that the ABM Treaty's provi-
sions apply to the new ABM technologies. Therefore, lasers, particle
beam weapons, infrared sensors and other types of new BMD tech-
nologies, although not specifically mentioned in the treaty, should by
viewed as included within its limitations.
C. Definition of the Term "Space-Based"
Under the ABM Treaty, BMD systems and components may be
57. This interpretation is supported by Ambassador Gerard Smith, Chief of the U.S. Salt I
Delegation, who stated that the agreed statement, together with the relevant treaty provisions,
bans "systems employing possible future types of components to perform the functions of
launchers, interceptors and radars . G. SMITH, DOUBLETALK: THE STORY OF SALT I
344 (1980).
58. ABM Treaty, supra note 8.
59. Darnton, Weinberger Says ABM Pact May Ultimately Need Amending, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 25, 1983, at A9, col. 1. In regard to development of a space-based BMD, however, this
statement is incorrect. See supra text accompanying note 51.
60. Schmemann, Soviet Sees a Treaty Violation In Arms Proposed by Reagan, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 25, 1983, at A9, col. 5. The Tass statement did not address research and development.
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developed and tested if they are fixed and land-based, but not if they
are space-based. 6' Certain BMD proposals involve land-based
launchers with components which would operate and accomplish
their mission in space.6 2 In determining the restrictions applicable to
these proposals, it is necessary to determine whether such systems
fall within the scope of the term "space-based" as used in the ABM
Treaty.
The ABM Treaty contains no definition of the term "space-
based," nor was the issue discussed in the United States during the
ratification hearings. Furthermore, no State practice regarding this
issue is discernable. Thus, the ordinary meaning of the term must be
examined. 63 While the meaning of the term "space" is subject to de-
bate,64 the term "based" is capable of definition. The ordinary mean-
ing includes the concept of permanency; it also relates to the concept
of a place from which operations commence. 65  For example,
although ICBM's travel through space on the way to accomplishing
their mission, they are considered land-based because the launchers
from which operations commence are permanently located on the
land. The scope of the term "space-based" should therefore be con-
fined to BMD components which are placed in earth orbit. Orbiting
BMD systems have some permanency in space and only commence
their BMD operations after achieving orbit.66  Consequently, land-
61. See supra text accompanying note 51.
62. See supra note 30.
63. Vienna Convention, supra note 55, art. 31.
64. No definition or delimitation of the term "space" is contained in the ABM Treaty or
any other international agreement. The U.S. position has been that no such agreement is re-
quired. For discussion of the reasons underlying this position see Treaty on Outer Space. Hear-
ings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1967). Numerous
theories have been offered regarding the proper boundary of outer space. See Cheng, The Legal
Regime ofAirspace and Outer Space.- The Boundary Problem Functionalism Versus Spatialism:
The Major Premises, 5 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 323 (1980); Qizhi, The Problem of Definition
and Delimitation of Outer Space, 10 J. SPACE L. 157 (1982); C. CHRISTOL, THE MODERN
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 502-11 (1982). While the exact location of the
boundary of outer space has not been agreed on, it is generally accepted that objects which
orbit the earth are located in space. Id. at 505. Moreover, there is a growing acceptance for the
proposition that the boundary of space is reached at the altitude of 100 kilometers above sea
level. Id. at 510. During their mid-course phase ICBM's operate well above that altitude even
on depressed trajectories. Carter & Schwartz, supra note 18, at 51.
65. The Oxford Dictionary includes the following relevant definitions of "base": (1) that
from which a commencement of action or reckoning is made, regarded as a fundamental start-
ing point; and (2) the line or place upon which the general of an army relies as a stronghold and
magazine, and from which the operations of a campaign are conducted. I OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 686 (1961).
66. See Carter & Schwartz, supra note 18, at 226 ("it is the basing that is determining.
The treaty clearly permits interceptor missiles, which fly when they operate, provided their
Vol. 15
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based components such as the Homing Overlay Experiment6 7 may be
developed and tested in space without violating the ABM Treaty.
D. Limitations on Research, Development and Deployment of
Space-Based ABM Systems
Two provisions of the ABM Treaty prohibit deployment of a
space-based BMD system. Article V bars deployment of ABM sys-
tems or components which are space-based. Article IX bans deploy-
ment of ABM systems or components outside "national territory."
Testing, the usual step prior to deployment, is also barred under Ar-
ticle V, under which each party undertook not to test space-based
ABM systems or components.6"
The most difficult issue raised by Article V is determining the
intention of parties when they undertook not to "develop" space-
based ABM systems or components. While the word develop is used
three times in Article V, the ABM Treaty contains no definition of
the term.6 9 This raises the crucial issue of where study and research
end and development begins. During the Congressional hearings on
the ABM Treaty, the interpretation of the term develop was dis-
cussed. Ambassador Smith stated: "The prohibitions on develop-
ment . . . would start at that part of the development process where
field testing is initiated . . . . [T]he prohibition on "development"
applies to activities involved after a component moves from the labo-
ratory development and testing stage to the field testing stage, wher-
ever performed." 7 ° Since no agreed statement on the interpretation
launchers are fixed."). But see Payne, supra note 30, at 56-57. The potential for preliminary
testing in space of a non-orbiting system ultimately intended for use in orbit has been sug-
gested. Id. According to the foregoing analysis, such testing would be permissible under the
ABM Treaty.
67. See supra note 30.
68. The inclusion of components is important because testing may have several aspects
and stages. For example, in the recent testing of the U.S. ASAT, no satellite or target of any
type was involved, the miniature homing vehicle was not used, and no part of the weapon
system went into orbit. USAF Flight Tests ASA T Weapon, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
Jan. 30, 1984, at 19. While this was not a test of a deployable ASAT, certain components of
the system were tested. Similar tests of ABM components may be illegal under Article V. See
infra note 79 and accompanying text.
69. The same word is used in the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their
Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, T.I.A.S. No. 8062. The Parties undertook never to
"develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain" biological weapons. That treaty
also fails to define the term "develop." ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS,
supra note 40, at 124.
70. Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems
and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms: Hearings Before the
14
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of this important term was made by the Parties, further analysis is
necessary to determine the accuracy of Ambassador Smith's
comments.
Some insight into this issue is gained by examining the ordinary
meaning of the term develop and the subsequent practice of the Par-
ties.7 ' The ordinary meaning implies the culmination of growth or
the evolution from a lesser stage to functional existence.72 The word
used in the Russian text is defined as "create." 73 In the context of
the ABM Treaty it is logical to conclude that research and study of
potential ABM technologies involves the lesser stage. This stage in-
cludes the "laboratory development and testing" referred to by Am-
bassador Smith.74 Field testing in "an ABM mode,""5 however,
constitutes the culmination of growth, or creation, which the Parties
intended to prohibit.
Subsequent practice of the United States and Soviet Union sup-
ports this interpretation. Both Parties have spent billions of dollars
on technological research which is applicable to a BMD.76 Neither
side has protested that such acts violate the ABM Treaty. By their
failure to protest, the Parties have tacitly acknowledged that they
consider laboratory research to be permissible under the Treaty.
In addition, Article XII, which relates to compliance by "na-
tional technical means of verification," supports an interpretation of
develop which draws the line at field testing. National technical
means include satellites, aircraft and sea and ground-based systems
Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 377 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ABM
Treaty Hearings]. Ambassador Smith's definition has been accepted in statements submitted to
Congress by President Reagan. See U.S. CONGRESS JOINT COMM., 98TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
FISCAL YEAR 1985 ARMS CONTROL IMPACT STATEMENTS 212, 252 (Comm. Print 1984).
71. These factors may be explored to help establish the meaning of a treaty. Vienna Con-
vention, supra note 55, art. 31.
72. The Oxford Dictionary contains several relevant definitions of "develop." These
include:
(1) to bring forth from a latent or elementary condition (a physical agent or
condition of matter);
(2) to make manifest what already existed under some other form or condition;
(3) to evolve (as a product) from pre-existing materials;
(4) to cause to grow or to come into active existence or operation;
(5) to exhibit or display in a well-formed condition or in active operation.
III OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 279-80 (1961).
73. RHINELANDER, supra note 56, at 134.
74. ABM Treaty Hearings, supra note 70.
75. For a discussion of this term see supra note 47.
76. Burt, Pentagon Says It May Revive Antiballistic Missiles, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1980,
at A19, col. 1.
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which employ radar, optical systems and antennas.7 7 These systems
cannot detect laboratory research of ABM technology. Therefore,
their specification as the means for verifying treaty compliance is evi-
dence of an intent not to prohibit such activities.7 8
Considering these factors, the most reasonable conclusion is that
the Parties did not intend the term develop to include laboratory re-
search of ABM technologies. Rather, their intent was to prevent the
field testing of space-based ABM systems or components in an ABM
mode. The scope of this prohibition, however, has been the subject of
recent discussion. Some supporters of strategic defense have ad-
vanced a restrictive definition of the term "components." In addition
they have put forward a concept of technology "demonstrations"
which provides for some research outside the laboratory.7 9 Such def-
initions have been criticized by Ambassador Smith and others.8 ° The
ambiguity of the ABM Treaty on these crucial terms, and the lack of
any agreed statement regarding their definition point to a need for
the Parties to clarify these issues. Such action could be taken by the
Standing Consultative Commission. Unless this is done, the ABM
Treaty will have little affect in restricting the development of a space-
77. BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, SELECTED Doc. No. 12A,
SALT II AGREEMENT 62 (1979).
78. This point was asserted by Ambassador Smith in his Congressional testimony. ABM
Treaty Hearings, supra note 70.
The U.S. has always considered reliable verification as central to arms control agreements.
Vlasic, Raison d'Etat v. Raison de l'Humanite-The United Nations SSOD II and Beyond, 28
MCGILL L.J. 455, 486 (1983).
79. Reagan Administration officials have interpreted the term "components" in such a
way as to include within its scope only devices capable of completely substituting for traditional
BMD components-radars, launchers, or interceptor missiles. Longstreth & Pike, A Report on
the Impact of US. and Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense Programs on the ABM Treaty 18 (1984)
(prepared for tl~e National Campaign to Save the ABM Treaty). Such an interpretation would
permit significant "research" outside the laboratory of space-based BMD related technology
which did not involve a "component." Such research could even extend to tests, which have
been referred to as "demonstrations." According to Lt. Gen. Abrahmason, Director of the
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, "significant technological demonstrations" can be
carried out within the limits of the ABM Treaty. Robinson, Strategic Defense Group Speeds
Efforts, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., June 11, 1984, at 16, 18.
80. Ambassador Smith recently stressed that the intent of proscribing "development" of a
space-based BMD technology was to bar activities outside the laboratory, no matter what ter-
minology is used. "The first point in time we can see them doing something [with national
technical means of verification] that is where the ban starts." Address by Ambassador Gerard
Smith, MIT-Harvard Summer Program on Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control (June 27,
1984). According to Ambassador Smith, "demonstrations" of ABM components, if outside the
laboratory, are not permitted by the ABM Treaty. Id. Mr. Rhinelander, the former legal advi-
sor of the U.S. Salt I delegation, has stated "the basic cut-off point ... was, roughly speaking:
if you can see it, it's prohibited." Doe, ABM Treaty May Be Headed For Scrap Heap, A.F.
TIMES, July 16, 1984, at 26, 27. See also Longstreth & Pike, supra note 79, at 19.
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based BMD system at any level less that the actual testing in an
ABM mode.
E. The Problem of Dual-Use Technology
The ABM Treaty does not purport to limit deployment of weap-
ons for non-BMD purposes, such as in an ASAT role. Theoretically,
the potential exists for weapons to be based in space provided that
they have not been tested in an "ABM mode."'" If this were to oc-
cur, it is possible that the weapons would also have a BMD capabil-
ity.82 Such a capability, even untested, would be of great concern to
a potential adversary. Naturally, this dual-use capability presents the
risk of treaty breakout, and this aspect of the ABM Treaty has been
noted in the literature as a "loophole." 83
One may argue that such weapons fall within the parameters of
the Agreed Statement,84 as components which are "capable of substi-
tuting for" ABM missiles, launchers or radars. As such, they are
prohibited by the ABM Treaty.8 5 The Agreed Statement, however,
like the ABM Treaty, is aimed only at "ABM systems."' 86 The Party
possessing these systems can simply assert that the weapons are not a
component of an ABM system, and therefore the ABM Treaty is
inapplicable. Moreover, the capability of such weapons in a BMD
mode can be denied. Untested capabilities, like intentions, are diffi-
cult to establish. Nevertheless, neither the Soviet Union nor the
United States are likely to ignore such a potential capablility.
The possibility for the development of such a situation will re-
main unless a comprehensive agreement on weapons in space is
reached. However, the likelihood of such an agreement in the near
future is small.8 7
81. For a discussion of this term see supra note 47. The U.S. Dept. of Defense has esti-
mated that in the early 1990's the Soviet Union could establish an operational space-based laser
system capable of attacking satellites. SMITH, "STAR WARS": ANTISATELLITES AND SPACE-
BASED BMD 6 (Library of Congress, Congresssional Research Service, Issue Brief No.
IB81123 1984). The U.S. also has a program for developing space-based lasers for ASAT use.
Id. at 7-8.
82. Payne, supra note 30, at 63-64.
83. Vlasic, Disarmament Decade, Outer Space and International Law, 26 MCGILL L.J.
135, 177 (1981).
84. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
85. See Payne, supra note 30, at 63-64.
86. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
87. The Soviet Union has submitted a proposal to the UN which included provisions to
ban testing and deployment of any space-based weapon. U.N. Doc. A/38/194 (1983). Due
primarily to lack of effective verification, the Reagan Administration has taken the position
that "no arrangements or agreements beyond those already governing military activites in
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III. SPACE-BASED BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE
OUTER SPACE TREATY
A. General Provisions
The Outer Space Treaty8 8 entered into force in 1967 and was the
culmination of several United Nations General Assembly resolutions.
Regarded as the basic charter of space law, the first two articles es-
tablish the principle of freedom of outer space. 89 The Outer Space
Treaty also contains general principles on many aspects of the explo-
ration and use of outer space. These include: (1) the rescue and re-
turn of astronauts,9" (2) liability for space activities,9" and
(3) registration of space objects.92
Article III stipulates that Parties are to carry on their activities
in outer space "in accordance with international law, including the
Charter of the United Nations, in the interest of maintaining interna-
tional peace and security . . . ." The key arms control provision,
however, is Article IV.93 It establishes two separate regimes. The
first paragraph covers "outer space," where space-based BMD com-
ponents would operate. It prohibits the placement of nuclear weap-
ons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit or the stationing of
such weapons in outer space. 94 Paragraph two relates to "the Moon
outer space have been found to date that are judged to be in the overall interest of the United
States and its Allies." Letter from President Reagan to the Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr.,
Speaker of the House of Representatives (March 31, 1984) (transmitting President Reagan's
Report to the Congress Concerning U.S. Policy on ASAT Arms Control). Nevertheless, recent
events indicate that potential for agreement on space weapons does exist. In January 1985,
Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko met in Geneva
to discuss an agenda for talks on limiting nuclear arms. They reached a compromise agreement
to resume negotiations on limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and on "preventing an arms race
in space."
88. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 9.
89. Art. I states that "the exploration and use of outer space... shall be carried out for
the benefit and in the interests of all countries..." and that "[o]uter space ... shall be free
for exploration and use by all States . Art. II provides that "[o]uter space is not subject
to national appropriation . Id.
90. Id. art. V.
91. Id. arts. VI, VII.
92. Id. art. VIII.
93. Art. IV provides:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the earth any
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction,
install such weapons on celesteial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in
any other manner.
The Moon and other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the
Treaty exclusively for peaceful purposes. The establishment of military bases, instal-
lations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons, and the conduct of mili-
tary maneuvers on celestial bodies shall be forbidden. . ..
94. This prohibition originated in a joint U.S.-Soviet pledge made in 1963, which was
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and other celestial bodies," and establishes their use "exclusively for
peaceful purposes."
B. "Nuclear Weapons" and Other "Weapons of Mass Destruction"
While the first paragraph of Article IV of the Outer Space
Treaty prohibits placing "nuclear weapons" or other "weapons of
mass destruction" in earth orbit, the Treaty does not define these
terms. Weapons of mass destruction are generally considered to be
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons which result in the indis-
criminate killing of many people in a large area.95 The beam weap-
ons and small homing vehicles currently under study as components
of a space-based BMD would not cause such a result. On the con-
trary, the success of the new weapons systems depends on their abil-
ity to zero-in on a small target, for example, a ballistic missile in
flight. For this reason beam weapons and homing vehicles are not
"weapons of mass destruction." One particular technology, the nu-
clear powered x-ray laser, warrants further examination.
The nuclear powered x-ray laser would use energy from a small
nuclear explosion to send intense pulses of x-rays at enemy missiles.96
The laser beam, of course, would be a weapon, but the issue arises
whether the device itself should be considered a "nuclear weapon"
because it derives energy from a nuclear explosion. In general, the
term "nuclear weapon" has not been defined in international agree-
ments.97 However, it is defined in the Latin America Nuclear-Free
unanimously adopted in the General Assembly resolution entitled General and Complete Dis-
armament, G.A. Res. 1884, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 15) at 13, U.N. Doc. A/5571 (1963).
Land-based BMD components which operate in space but do not go into orbit and are not
stationed in outer space are not covered by this provision. S. GOROVE, SPACE LAW: ITS
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS 87 (1977) (The term "stationed" implies "a relatively fixed or-
bit in relation to the underlying celestial body"). They are, nevertheless, subject to the general
requirement of the "peaceful use" of outer space. See infra text accompanying notes 104-15.
95. Mallison, The Laws of War and the Juridical Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction
in General and Limited Wars, 36 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 326 (1967). Former U.S. Ambas-
sador to the UN Arthur Goldberg stated that weapons of mass destruction were those "of
comparable capability of annihilation to a nuclear weapon .. ." Hearings on the Outer Space
Treaty Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1967). Other
weapons may be developed in the future that will be considered weapons of mass destruction.
See Bridge, International Law and Military Activities in Outer Space, 13 AKRON L. REV. 649,
657 (1980).
96. When a nuclear device explodes it produces massive quantities of x-rays. This device
uses laser rods to focus some of the x-ray energy into beams which can destroy enemy missiles
on contact. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE NEW ARMS RACE: STAR WARS WEAP-
ONS 1 (1983).
97. In addition to the ABM Treaty, this term is used, but not defined in the Test Ban
Treaty, supra note 16, and in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1,
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Zone Treaty,9" which states: "For the purposes of this Treaty, a nu-
clear weapon is any device which is capable of releasing nuclear en-
ergy in an uncontrolled manner and which has a group of
characteristics that are appropriate for use for warlike purposes." 99
The nuclear x-ray laser would clearly have characteristics "appropri-
ate for use for warlike purposes." In addition, the nuclear explosion
would not only direct some of its energy to its laser rods, but would
also destroy the weapon itself and release nuclear energy in an "un-
controlled manner."'" Thus, under this or any similar definition
the nuclear powered x-ray laser is a "nuclear weapon" and not
merely a laser weapon with a nuclear power source."10
Another treaty relevant to the issue of the x-ray laser is the Lim-
ited Test Ban Treaty of 1963.102 This Treaty prohibits any nuclear
explosion in outer space or the atmosphere. 10 3 No nation is likely to
deploy a major weapon system without testing it in its operating en-
vironment. Thus, it appears that the nuclear x-ray laser is unavaila-
ble as a space component of a BMD system under the current legal
regime.
C. "Peaceful" Use of Outer Space
Unlike the second paragraph of Article IV of the Outer Space
Treaty, which covers the Moon and other celestial bodies, the first
paragraph does not state that outer space must be used "exclusively
for peaceful purposes."'" Nevertheless, there is general agreement
that activities in outer space should be confined to "peaceful" uses.' 5
1968, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 21 U.S.T. 483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force
Mar. 5, 1970).
98. Treaty for the Prohibitions of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, Feb. 14, 1967,
U.N. Doc. A/C.1/946 (1967), reprinted in ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS,
supra note 40, at 64 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1968).
99. Id. art. V.
100. Carter, supra note 25, at 25-26.
101. Nuclear powered satellites have been used since 1961. Jasentuliyana, A Perspective of
the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space, 4 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 255, 259 n.21
(1972).
102. See supra note 16.
103. Test Ban Treaty, supra note 16, art. I. A system using a land-based nuclear x-ray laser
and space-based mirrors, such as that proposed by Mr. Keyworth, would be permissible under
the Outer Space Treaty since only the laser beam itself would travel through space. See Getler,
supra note 29. For the land-based nuclear power source to be legal under the Test Ban Treaty
the explosion would have to occur underground and not cause radioactive debris to be present
outside State territory. Test Ban Treaty, supra note 16, art. 1(b).
104. See supra note 93.
105. The policy of the U.S. government, as expressed in official statements and legislation
since 1958, has been that outer space should be devoted to peaceful purposes. See Reed &
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The definition of "peaceful," however, has been the subject of disa-
greement. There are two principal schools of thought on this issue.
One school asserts that peaceful means "nonagressive;" it permits all
conduct, including military activity, except for activity that is an ag-
gressive use of outer space. 10 6 This position has consistently been
asserted by a group of States led by the United States.° 7 The other
school of thought, usually espoused in Socialist jurisprudence, defines
peaceful as simply "non-military."' 0 8
The first view is a more persuasive interpretation because it is
supported by the practice of States, including the leading space pow-
ers. 10 9 Moreover, this view is supported by the recent UN Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea, which provides that the high seas are
reserved for "peaceful purposes."' 1o Since the Convention makes no
attempt to ban military vessels from the high seas, it implicitly ac-
knowledges that such a nonaggressive use of the high seas is a peace-
ful use. By analogy, the legality of a space-based BMD as a
"peaceful use" under the Outer Space Treaty depends on whether it
is an aggressive use."'
Norris, Military Use of the Space Shuttle, 13 AKRON L. REV.'665, 674 (1980). Official declara-
tions may have the effect of creating international legal obligations. See Nuclear Test Cases,
1974 I.C.J. 253. Numerous UN General Assembly resolutions provide that outer space should
be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. See, e.g., Regulation, Limitation and Balanced Re-
duction of all Armed Forces and all Armaments; Conclusion of an International Convention
(treaty) on the Reduction of Armaments and the Prohibition of Atomic, Hydrogen and other
Weapons of Mass Destruction, G.A. Res. 1148, 12 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 195, U.N.
Doc. A/3805 (1957), para. l(f) ("the sending of objects through outer space shall be exclusively
for peaceful and scientific purposes"); Question of the Peaceful Use of Outer Space, G.A. Res.
1348, 13 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 99, U.N. Doc. A/4090 (1958) ("outer space should be
used for peaceful purposes only .. "). Moreover, the preamble of the Outer Space Treaty
refers to the "peaceful" use of outer space three times. This subject has also been discussed
extensively in the related commentaries. See Vlasic, supra note 83, at 170-75; Gorove, supra
note 94, at 88-94; Reed & Norris, supra note 105, at 674; Bridge, supra note 95, at 657; Lay &
Taulbenfeld, The Law Relating to Activities of Man in Space, reprinted in J. SWEENY, C. OLI-
VER & N. LEECH, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 278 (2d ed. 1981); Cheng, The Legal
Status of Outer Space and Relevant Issues: Delimitation of Outer Space and Definition of Peace-
ful Use, 11 J. SPACE L. 89, 98-105 (1983); Goedhuis, Some Observations on the Efforts to Pre-
vent a Military Escalation in Outer Space, 10 J. SPACE L. 13, 16-18 (1982); Markoff,
Disarmament and "Peaceful Purposes" Provisions in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, 4 J. SPACE L.
3 (1976).
106. Vlasic, supra note 83, at 171.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
110. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 88, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/122
(this Convention has not entered into force).
111. While this definition of "peaceful use" is the most persuasive, it could lead to a rather
extreme result. Not only would it allow space-based BMD systems, but it would also include
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"Aggressive" is not an easy term to define. UN General Assem-
bly Resolution 3314 defines aggression as "the use of armed force by
a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political inde-
pendence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition."' 2
Article II of Resolution 3314 makes the first use of armed force by a
State prima facie evidence of an act of aggression. Moreover, Article
III lists several acts such as invasion, attack, bombardment or block-
ade which qualify as acts of aggression. These statements indicate
that it is the actual use of armed force that determines whether there
is an act of aggression, not merely the nature of the force itself."1 3
For example, naval vessels on the high seas are a potential instru-
ment of aggression; however, they do not commit an act of aggres-
sion unless they are used in an act such as an attack, bombardment
or blockade.
When this analysis is applied to a space-based BMD its nonag-
gressive character becomes apparent. If employed in a defensive role
against missiles launched in a first strike, an act of aggression would
already have occurred and the inherent right of self-defense would
permit the use of the BMD.'1 4 Of course, if used in combination
with an offensive attack it would be an aggressive use. However, the
mere existence of the system is not an aggressive use any more than
the mere presence of a naval vessel on the high seas."'
D. The Potential of "Harmful Interference"
Pursuant to Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty, activities in
weapons which were not nuclear weapons, and which were not weapons of mass destruction.
Even space "battle ships" would be permissible. One may question whether the majority of
States which signed the Outer Space treaty in 1967 anticipated or desired such an outcome. See
Vlasic, supra note 83, at 174.
112. Definition of Agression, G.A. Res. 3314,29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1975).
113. The act of threatening the use of armed force may also be an illegal act of aggression.
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter provides: "All members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Na-
tions." U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
114. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. Article 51 of the UN Charter provides: "Nothing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations .... " This right is fully appli-
cable in outer space. DeSaussure & Reed, Self Defense-A Right in Outer Space, 7 A.F. JAG
L. REV. 38 (1965).
115. See also Stein, supra note 101, at 262-63. "Clearly [Article IV) does not prohibit...
satellites or space stations having anti-missile, communications or other military functions as
long as they do not carry nuclear or other mass destruction weapons." Id.
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outer space are to be "guided by the principle of co-operation and
mutual assistance . . ." and conducted "with due regard to the cor-
responding interests of all other States Parties to the Treaty." As a
result, States must avoid activities which would cause potentially
"harmful interference" with the peaceful exploration and use of outer
space by other States. Any system which employs a large number of
orbiting satellites1 16 must be carefully planned so as not to interfere
with the peaceful use of outer space by other States. Two areas of
potential interference-orbital congestion and electromagnetic spec-
trum interference-must be considered.
It is unlikely that a space-based BMD would cause harmful in-
terference as a result of orbital congestion. Although placing over
400 satellites in orbit would be significant, there are already approxi-
mately 5,000 man-made objects in earth orbit."' Moreover, the orbi-
tal parameters of each satellite would have to be registered with the
United Nations, and other States could plan their activities based on
that information."' Significantly, most satellites in a BMD would be
in low-earth orbit," 9 which would avoid problems inherent in the use
of the geostationary orbit.12
0
Interference is also a problem mainly associated with the use of
the geostationary orbit. Use of the electromagnetic spectrum for
communication with satellite components of a BMD would be
planned to minimize interference, mainly since interference is a two-
way proposition. Moreover, military communications usually em-
ploy a frequency higher than other users because higher frequencies
are more difficult to jam.' 2' In summary, with careful planning a
space-based BMD could be established without creating significant
harmful interference with the peaceful exploration and use of outer
space by any other State.
116. See supra note 29.
117. Canby, Satellites That Serve Us, 164 NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Sept. 1983, at 281, 333. As
of June 20, 1983 there were 4,914 man-made objects in space including spent rocket boosters
and debris, as well as functioning and nonfunctioning satellites.
118. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975, 28
U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480 (entered into force Sept. 15, 1976).
119. See supra note 29.
120. The geostationary orbit is a circular equatorial orbit at a height of 36,000 kilometers
(22,300 miles). A satellite in that orbit maintains a position over a given spot on the earth's
equator. By its nature, it can accommodate a limited number of satellites and is considered to
be a limited natural resource. See N. MATTE, AEROSPACE LAW 34-35 (1977); Jakhu, The
Evolution of the ITU's Regulatory Regime Governing Space Radiocommunication Services and
the Geostationary Satellite Orbit, 8 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 381 (1983).
121. R. GIFFEN, U.S. SPACE SYSTEM SURVIVABILITY, STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES FOR
THE 1990's 30 (Nat'l Security Affairs Monograph Series 82-4, 1982).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Research on a space-based BMD is permitted by the ABM
Treaty and may be pursued up to the stage of field testing. At that
point, however, "development" begins. Development of a space-
based BMD is barred by the ABM Treaty. Nevertheless, non-orbital
BMD components which operate in space from a land-based mode
are not "space-based," and could be legally developed. Moreover,
weapons with a potential BMD capability could be developed and
deployed in space provided they had not been tested in an ABM
mode. These last two factors demonstrate that although the ABM
Treaty is applicable to the new BMD related technologies, their rapid
advance and dual-use nature has rendered the ABM Treaty ill-suited
to control their future development in an effective manner. If such
control is desired by the Parties, amendment of the treaty should be
attempted. However, the existence of dual use technologies may
make a comprehensive, verifiable treaty on all space weapons a more
desirable course of action.
The Outer Space Treaty has little affect on the establishment of
a BMD. Apart from the current exception of the nuclear powered x-
ray laser, the Outer Space Treaty does not ban research, development
or deployment of a space-based BMD system. Therefore, even
though the ABM Treaty has its weaknesses, it is the only instrument
which currently places any significant legal limitations on the devel-
opment of a non-nuclear, space-based BMD.
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